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Popular smartphone authentication schemes, such as PIN-based or biometrics- based 
authentication methods, require only an initial login at the start of a usage session to authorize 
the user to use all the apps on the phone during the entire session. Those schemes fail to provide 
continuous protection of the smartphone after the initial login. They also fail to meet the 
hierarchy of security requirements for different apps under different contexts. In this study, we 
propose a continuous and hierarchical authentication scheme. We believe that a user’s app-usage 
patterns depend on his location context. As such, our scheme relies on app-usage patterns in 
different location context to continuously establish the log probability density (LPD) of the 
authenticity of the current user. Based on different LPD thresholds corresponding to different 
security requirements, the current user either has a LPD higher than the threshold, which grants 
him continuous access to the phone or the app, or he has a LPD lower than the threshold, which 
locks him out of the phone or the app immediately. We test our scheme on 4,600 subjects from 
the Device Analyzer Dataset. We found that our scheme could correctly identify the authenticity 
of the majority of the subjects. However, app-usage patterns with or without location context 
yielded similar performances, indicating that user contexts did not contribute further information 
to establish user behavioral patterns. Based on our scheme, we propose a hypothetical Android 








Recent market research has predicted that 2 billon consumers will have smartphones by 
2016 [1]. Of these 2 billon smartphone users, many are using their phones to store an 
increasingly wider range of personal and sensitive information such as banking accounts, health 
data, intimate photos, personal conversations, romantic interests, and corporate secrets. 
Furthermore, many are also using their phones as identity tokens to access online services, such 
as social networks, as well as physical services, such as unlocking doors, controlling cars, 
boarding planes, and purchasing goods and services. Given the increasing amount of personal 
data that is stored on the phone and the growing number of sensitive actions that are available 
through the phone, there is an important need to design a mobile authentication method that is 
both usable and secure. 
To date, the most popular mobile authentication methods are non-hierarchical and 
non-continuous. Non-hierarchical authentication means that the same authentication method 
authorizes the users to use all applications on the mobile phones regardless of differing 
sensitivity of different apps under different context [2]. Non-continuous authentication means 
that some initial authentication scheme, such as password or biometrics, is only prompted at the 
beginning of a usage session. Once the mobile phone is unlocked by the user through the initial 
authentication, the phone remains accessible to all people until either the user turns off the screen 
or the current usage session has timed out. 
Non-hierarchical authentication provides poor user experience as it does not adapt to users’ 
different security requirements for different apps and under different contexts. In one study, 
subjects indicated that they want half of their apps to remain accessible all the time, and the other 
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half to be protected by authentications [2]. Some subjects also indicated that they do not worry 
about device security when the device is left at home [2]. In light of these results, one research 
study proposed to cluster GPS data to determine whether the subjects are at home, at work or at 
other places, and trigger different authentication methods based on the location context [8].  
Non-continuous authentication is also problematic as an adversary can easily steal valuable 
information on the phone after a user enters the initial authentication and leaves his phone 
unattended [3]. Previous research suggested continuous authentication of mobile phones, perhaps 
by recognizing learned user behaviors. In these methods, sensor and usage data (measured by 
smartphones) are aggregated to establish a user behavioral profile to non-intrusively and 
continuously authenticate the user as he is using the phone. Some examples of user behaviors 
include touch screen interaction [4], phone calls [5], text messages [5], browsing history [5], 
gait [6], and typing patterns [8].  
In our research, we aim to develop an authentication method that is both continuous and 
hierarchical. To improve on the existing research on continuous authentication, we augment the 
behavioral profile with location context. Our hypothesis is that the user behaviors are highly 
dependent on the location context. Therefore a hybrid model of user behaviors and location 
context would more securely and easily establish the identity of the correct owner. We define 
user behaviors to include app-usage data such as time of the day, number of apps used, duration 
of app-usage, and the top three apps used. We define location context to include location 
information indicated by either GPS coordinates or Wi-Fi MAC addresses.  
In our approach, we first cluster each user’s past location traces automatically to establish 
different contexts. We then build a behavioral model for each context for each user using past 
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behavioral data. This context-aware behavioral model is then used to calculate the log probability 
density (LPD) for the current smartphone usage; that is, an estimate of the likelihood that the 
current behavior and context fits the user’s historical behavior for this context.  
Our scheme can be used for both system-wide and app-specific access control. In terms of 
system-wide access control, our scheme provides continuous defense of the smartphone after the 
initial authentication. Once a user unlocks his phone through the initial authentication, a LPD 
value is continuously calculated. If at one moment the LPD value does not exceed a threshold 
specified in the user security settings, the phone will prompt the initial authentication again to 
authenticate the user for further usage of the phone. This continuous system-wide access control 
can be adapted to satisfy the different security needs under different contexts. For example, a 
user may specify a lower threshold for phone usage at home and a higher threshold for phone 
usage under unfamiliar contexts. In terms of app-specific access control, our approach allows 
users to specify different security needs for different apps. For example, for non-sensitive apps 
such as Calculator, Weather, and News, a user can specify a low threshold for the LPD such that 
no password will be required even if the user behavior does not fit the behavioral model in the 
context. For apps that contain or provide access to personal information such as Facebook, Mail, 
and Phone, a user can specify a medium level threshold for the LPD such that password will be 
required if the user behavior deviates too much from the context-aware behavioral model. For 
apps that contain highly sensitive information such as Banking, Shopping, and Health, a high 
threshold for the LPD might be specified to require that user behavior follows the model closely 




2 Related Work 
  
    Our research both drew inspiration from and improved on existing research about continuous 
authentication and hierarchical authentication.  
2.1 Continuous Authentication  
 
Existing research on continuous authentication relies on the collection of user behavioral data 
from the phone to “continuously and transparently authenticate mobile device users” [10]. Some 
of these behavioral data include touch-screen interaction [4], phone calls [5], text messages [5], 
browsing history [5], gait [6] and typing patterns [8].  
However, simply relying on user behavioral data does not sufficiently and securely 
authenticate the smartphone user. First, many user behaviors do not provide a constant stream of 
data, and no authentication can be properly established during the period of no data. For example, 
sedentary users would have long periods where no gait information can be detected [10]. Typing 
activity will be scarce for users who mostly use their phones to play games, browse news, and 
make phone calls. Second, some of the behavioral pattern established by previous research may 
be susceptible to adversarial mimicry. For example, an adversary with possession of the 
smartphone can simply check browsing history to enter a few recent websites to replicate the 
authentic behavioral patterns to gain authorization [10]. Third, user behaviors vary in different 
contexts, but current research often generalizes a single behavioral pattern across all 
contexts [10] [11]. Such blanket behavioral patterns may yield good results during controlled 
experiments that require the users to perform certain actions, but the blanket pattern may not be 
“representative of natural user interactions” [11]. 
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2.2 Hierarchical Authentication 
 
One research direction for the hierarchical authentication is to use location context to 
determine the level of confidence in the current context and to trigger different initial 
authentication methods accordingly. For example, Hayashi et al. used location traces and 
5-Nearest Neighbor classification algorithm to determine whether the subject is at home, at work 
or at other places [8]. Such context information is then used to trigger different initial 
authentication methods such as “no authentication, a PIN, [or] a password” [8]. During the 
five-day training phase of this scheme, users are required to label their location traces as either 
“home”, “work”, or “other”. Such a long duration for explicit labeling of location traces raises 
not only usability issues but also privacy concerns.  
Another research direction of hierarchical authentication is to use a combination of signals 
from the smartphone to determine the level of confidence in the user’s authenticity.  Riva et al. 
suggested the use of biometric signals, behavioral signals, possession signals and secrets to 
determine the different confidence levels of the user’s authenticity [9]. Both the confidence 
levels of the user’s authenticity and the security requirements of each app are labeled as one of 
“public”, “private”, or “confidential” [9]. A user can only access those apps with security 
requirements lower than or equal to the user’s calculated confidence level. For example, a user 
who has a “private” confidence level can only access apps labeled as “public” or “private”, but 
not apps labeled as “confidential” [9].  However, in the report of their results, 37.31% of 





2.3 Our Approach 
 
Our approach provides the following improvements over the existing research. First, we 
analyze the user behavior in context. We do not rely on only the behavioral data, which vary 
across different contexts. Nor do we consider solely the contextual data, which are only a good 
second factor and not a primary factor in authentication [10]. The combination of behavioral and 
contextual data also enables us to build a more nuanced and complex user profile that is less 
susceptible to adversarial mimicry. Second, our model uses data that occur with high frequency 
and are almost always available. The high availability of our feature set enables us to achieve 
truly “continuous” authentication as new data are continuously fed into our context-aware 
behavioral model to authenticate the users. Third, we test our proposal on a large dataset of 
Android device usage data. The dataset was collected in uncontrolled environments. Thus it 
should avoid the pitfalls of “unauthentic usage” as in many controlled and lab-based experiments. 
Fourth, in our hierarchical approach, the users, rather than the researchers, can set different 
security requirements using different LPD thresholds to balance their needs for convenience and 








3 Algorithm and Implementation 
 
    The development of our context-aware behavioral model had three essential phases, outlined 
in Figure 1 below and explained in more detail in the following sub-sections.  
 








•Extract Behavioral and Contextual Features 
• Learn Context Classes Automatically 
• Learn Usage Behavior per Context 
Training 
• Identify Context Class for the Test Point 
•Compute Log Probability Density based on the Behavior 
•Benchmark Context-aware Behavioral model with Context-agnostic 
Behavioral Model 
Testing 
•Continuous Update Model Perimeters Based on More Authorized 




3.1 Device Analyzer Dataset 
 
Both the training and the testing phase of our project used the Device Analyzer Dataset 
collected by Cambridge University. The Device Analyzer Dataset contains “over 100 billion 
records of Android smartphone usage from over 17,000 devices across the globe” [17]. We have 
chosen the Device Analyzer Dataset for three reasons. First, the Device Analyzer collects data 
for a large number of features, including all of the behavioral and the contextual features we 
need. Second, the Dataset contains information for a large number of subjects from many 
different geographical areas. The diversity and the scale of the dataset allow us to better predict 
how our model will perform in the real world. Third, subjects of the Device Analyzer study 
simply install the data collection app on their phones and continue to use their phones as normal. 
We expect that this naturalist data collection method provides more authentic user behaviors than 
a lab-based data collection method.   
As user behaviors and contexts are likely to shift in the long run, we focus on a maximum of 
21 days of data for each subject, as suggested by previous work [16]. The Device Analyzer 
Dataset collected different types of data at different frequency. As such, we combine one 
incidence of Wi-Fi scan with its closest subsequent incidence of app-usage data collection into 
one single data entry. We define one data entry for a subject to consist of two neighboring 
incidences of data collection, which must contain all of the behavioral and contextual features we 
require. Since not all subjects in the Device Analyzer Dataset have continuous stream of data we 
require, we select only those 4,600 subjects who have at least 1,000 data entries for their first 21 




For each of the 4,600 subjects, we divide sequentially all of his or her data entries in the 
proportion of 9 to 1 for the training and the testing of our models respectively. 
3.2 Training Phase 
 
    During the training phase, we extract all of the required behavioral and contextual features 
from the training set and build a behavioral model for each subject in each context.  
3.2.1 Extract Behavioral and Contextual Features 
 
To extract behavioral features, we first loop through all data entries of each subject, and we 
rank the top three apps for each subject based on the total duration of usage of each app. We then 
extract the following features for each data entry for every subject, and we normalize all the 
following features so that they have comparable means and variances: 
 Minute in the day at the present app data collection 
 Total number of apps used at the foreground since the last app data collection 
 Total duration of foreground app-usage since the last app data collection 
 Duration of usage for the top 1 - 3 apps since the last app data collection 
     We selected these features because their data occur at a high frequency. Moreover, we believe 
those features vary in different contexts. For example, a user is more likely to use certain apps in 
the afternoon with a workplace Wi-Fi while he is more likely to use other apps at night with a 
home Wi-Fi. Furthermore, we also believe the app-usage features vary from individual to 
individual. For example, a heavy phone user might have a longer total duration of app-usage 
and/or likely a larger number of apps used. On the other hand, an infrequent phone user might 
have a shorter total duration of usage and/or fewer number of apps used.  
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To extract location context, we use the set of Wi-Fi MAC addresses available in each Wi-Fi 
scan. Most of previous research has used GPS coordinates as an indicator of location context. 
The use of GPS is not preferable in our opinion because storing GPS traces in the phones raises 
potential security problems if an adversary takes possession of the phone and discovers where 
the user is living through those GPS traces. Furthermore, GPS works only in open areas, but 
urban dwellers spend most of their time indoors. The basement and the top floor in the same 
building might be different contexts and thus we should expect different usage patterns for the 
same smartphone user. Most importantly, the Device Analyzer Dataset has only around 150 
subjects who were willing to share their GPS traces. Using GPS coordinates for location context 
would considerably decrease the number of qualified subjects. Given the shortcomings of GPS 
coordinates, we decided to use Wi-Fi MAC addresses as a proxy for location. The Wi-Fi MAC 
addresses have been one-way hashed to better protect the users’ privacy. Unlike GPS coordinates, 
Wi-Fi MAC addresses can often distinguish between the top floor and the basement within the 
same building. 
3.2.2 Learning Context Classes 
 
The second step in the training phase is to automatically cluster all contextual features into 
different context classes. We expect that different smartphone users will likely have different 
numbers of context classes. For example, a student may have three context classes: study space, 
dorm space, and other space. On the other hand, a frequent business traveller may have multiple 
context classes in each city where he works.  Since the number of context classes is unknown 
and varies from individual to individual, we used DBSCAN to automatically find the number of 
context classes and to classify all contextual features into each of these classes [12]. 
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 The implementation of DBSCAN requires a distance function to gauge the differences 
between two sets of features. Since our location context is non-numeric and contains sets of Wi-
Fi MAC addresses found during Wi-Fi scan, we believe that the optimal choice for distance 
function would be the Jaccard distance function, which is used for comparing similarity or 
diversity between different sets [13]. The pseudo code for the implementation of Jaccard distance 
function is given in Figure 2 below:  
 
Figure 2 Jaccard Distance Pseudo Code 
The implementation of DBSCAN also requires us to specify the epsilon value, which is the 
“maximum distance between two samples for them to be considered as in the same 
neighborhood”, and min_samples value, which is the “number of samples in a neighborhood for 
a point to be considered as a core point” [14]. If a particular point does not have at least 
min_samples number of points in a distance epsilon from itself, this point will be considered as a 
“noisy point”.  
To select appropriate values for epsilon and min_samples, we selected 20 representative 
subjects who had at least 1,000 entries of Wi-Fi MAC addresses and GPS coordinates for the 
first 21 days of data collection. For each subject, we clustered his Wi-Fi MAC addresses using 
epsilon values increasing from 0.1 to 0.9 at an interval of 0.2, and min_samples values increasing 
from 60 to 150 at an interval of 30. We define the best epsilon and min_samples value pair to be 
the one which generated relatively fewer “noisy points” and produced a reasonable number of 
clusters (e.g. 1~5). After analyzing the results of all 400 (=20x5x4) runs of DBSCAN, we found 
the best value pair for the 20 representative subjects to be (epsilon = 0.7, min_samples = 150). 
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We assumed this value pair to be the best for all of the 4,600 subjects chosen from the Device 
Analyzer Dataset. Detailed scatter plots of the number of clusters and the number of “noisy 
points” against different eps and min_samples values can be seen in Appendix II.  
To make sure our best value pair  (epsilon = 0.7, min_samples = 150) generated Wi-Fi MAC 
address clusters that properly model the location context, we calculated the in-cluster and inter-
cluster GPS Euclidian distances for all clusters generated by DBSCAN on Wi-Fi MAC addresses. 
The best value pair indeed gave smaller mean in-cluster GPS Euclidian distance and larger mean 
inter-cluster GPS Euclidian distance. This showed that DBSCAN with the best value pair 
clustered those Wi-Fi MAC addresses together if they were geographically close and separated 
those Wi-Fi MAC addresses into different clusters if they were geographically further apart.  
3.2.3 Learning Usage Behavior per Context 
 
We assume that each subject’s behavioral features to consist of multiple normal distributions. 
Once DBSCAN successfully clustered all data entries into different context classes, we built for 
each context class a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) using the behavioral features extracted 
from all entries in that context class. A GMM is a parametric probability density function that 
calculates the probability density of the behavioral data entry   under the context   using   
normal distributions, each with mean   , covariance matrix    , and mixing weights   . The 
formula is shown below. 
 ( | )  ∑  
 
   
 ( |     ) 
In the above formula,   can be any positive integer. The type of covariance parameter for    
can be any one of “diagonal”, “spherical”, “tied”, or “full”. To find the best    and the type of 
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covariance parameter, we loop through different values (1 to 10) for   and four different types of 
covariance parameter. For each value of   and type of covariance parameter, we use a Python 
machine learning package, scikit-learn, to conduct expectation-maximization to find the mean   , 
covariance matrix    , and mixing weights    of each of the   mixture components [15]. We 
then use Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to see how closely the GMM model represents 
the actual data. We eventually pick the value of   and type of covariance parameter that gives 
the best BIC results. 
The entire algorithm for finding the optimal GMM for each context class is described in the 
pseudo code below. The initialization, expectation, and maximization steps described below are 















3.3 Testing Phase 
 
    During the testing phase, we aim to evaluate how our context-aware behavioral model 
performs in identifying the correct or the wrong user. We also aim to evaluate how a context-
aware behavioral model performs in user identification as compared to a context-agnostic 
behavioral model. 
3.3.1 True Accept 
 
To test the performance of our model, we want to analyze whether our model is able to 
identify the correct owner (true accept). Ideally, we want the true accept rate to be as high as 
possible so that the correct user will be prompted to enter secondary authentication a minimum 
number of times.  
To calculate the true accept rate for each subject, we first take all the testing data for that 
subject. Since each subject has at minimum 1000 data entries and ten percent of those data 
entries are used for testing, we have at least 100 data entries for testing for each subject. For each 
data entry in the testing set, we identity the context class of the data entry based on its average 




Figure 4 Identifying Context Class of Data Entry Pseudo Code 
Once we have found the context class of the test data entry, we use the GMM model 
established during the training phase for that particular context class to calculate the LPD of the 
behavioral features extracted from the test data entry. LPD, the log probability density, is simply 
the log of the probability density of a data entry under a particular context calculated through the 
GMM model (i.e. LPD = log ( ( | ))). In real life, an entry would be accepted as belonging to 
the authentic user if the LPD is above a certain threshold. We have twelve LPD thresholds 
(0, -3, -6, -9, -12, -15, -18, -21, -24, -27, -30, -33) to determine whether the test data entry has a 
higher LPD than the threshold and therefore can be assumed to belong to the actual subject. In 
our actual study, we use more than twelve thresholds. We select these twelve representative 
thresholds to show a variety of results in this paper. The reason that we have so many LPD 
thresholds is to model the different security levels chosen by the user. A user more concerned 
with security can choose a higher LPD threshold so less similar behavioral patterns in the given 
context will not be accepted.  
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After looping through all training data entries of a subject S, the true accept rate of the subject 
S with a LPD threshold t (0, -3, -6, -9, -12, -15, -18, -21, -24, -27, -30, -33) is defined as the 
percentage of training data entries identified as the authentic subjects.   
3.3.2 False Accept 
 
   To test whether our model is robust to adversarial attack, we estimate whether our model might 
accept “incorrect subjects” (false accept). Optimally, we want the false accept rate to be as low 
as possible so that the wrong user will not be allowed to continue to use the device.  
To find the false accept rate of a subject S, we selected ten other subjects randomly. These ten 
other random subjects served to model the “incorrect subjects”. We take the first 100 data entries 
of each of the other ten “incorrect subjects”. The number of data entries used to calculate the 
false accept rate was chosen to be comparable to the number of data entries used to calculate the 
true accept rate. 
Since all “incorrect subjects” have different sets of Wi-Fi MAC addresses, we expect all data 
entries of the other ten “incorrect subjects” to belong to the noisy context class Cn of S. Indeed, 
we have to assume this to be true, because the Device Analyzer Dataset has one-way hashed all 
Wi-Fi MAC addresses and each subject has his unique hash key. As such, we cannot directly 
compare the sets of Wi-Fi MAC addresses between two subjects. Such a problem will not arise 
during the actual implementation of our system on an Android app since the same Android 
device will collect the Wi-Fi MAC addresses for both the authentic user and the adversary who 
attempts to use the authentic user’s phone.   
Given the GMM model established during the training phase for Cn, we calculate the LPD of 
the behavioral features of each of the 100 data entries for each of the other ten subjects. Once 
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again, we have twelve LPD thresholds (0, -3, -6, -9, -12, -15, -18, -21, -24, -27, -30, -33) to 
determine whether the test data entry has a higher LPD than the threshold and therefore can be 
assumed to belong to the subject S.  
For each of the other ten “incorrect subjects”, we define his false accept rate at a LPD 
threshold t (0,-3,-6,-9,-12,-15,-18,-21,-24,-27,-30,-33) to be the percentage of 100 data entries 
wrongly accepted, meaning, the method incorrectly determined that the “incorrect subject” is S. 
Since we have 10 “incorrect subjects” for each of the 4,600 original subjects, there will be a total 
of 46,000 false accept rates for the 46,000 “incorrect subjects”.  
3.3.3 Benchmark: Identification without Context 
 
The hypothesis of our project is that phone usage patterns depend on the location context. 
Therefore we assume that a context-aware behavioral model would better model the user 
behaviors and better predict user identity than a context-agnostic behavioral model. To construct 
a context-agnostic behavioral model, we tweaked the above implementation by assuming all data 
entries to belong to the same universal context class and building a single GMM for behavioral 
features across all training data entries of each subject. The true accept rate and false accept rate 








3.4 Model Update 
 
Kayasic et al. mentioned the problem of behavioral drift in the long run [16]. Indeed, a fervent 
Facebook user might become a zealous Snapchat user after a few months. Not only are usage 
patterns likely to change in the long run, the location context might shift as well. For example, a 
student who actively uses his phone at school will likely start using his phone actively at work 
once he graduates.  
We could account for both behavioral drift and contextual drift by updating our context classes 
and our GMM models based on the new data entries. It should be noted that, in the actual 
implementation of this system, only authorized data usage would be used to update the context-
aware behavioral model continuously. Usage data that first fail to meet the LPD threshold of our 
context-aware behavioral model and then fail to elicit the correct secondary explicit 
authentication would simply be discarded. We did not have time, though, to explore the potential 










4 Results and Discussions 
 
    Based on our context-aware and context-agnostic behavioral models sketched out in the 
previous section, we evaluated the true accept rate and the false accept rate across all 4,600 
subjects. The result of the context-aware model is shown in Section 4.1, while that of the 
context-agnostic model is shown in section 4.2. Section 4.1 and 4.2 only present a description of 
the results, while any discussion or interpretation of the description is deferred to Section 4.3.    
4.1 Context-aware Behavioral Model 
 
Table 1 on the following page shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, maximum and 
standard deviation) for the true accept rate across all 4,600 subjects using our context-aware 
behavioral model with different LPD thresholds.  
From Table 1, we can see that the mean true accept rate increased significantly as the LPD 
threshold decreased from 0 to -33. For threshold values between 0 to -9, less than half of the 
subjects were correctly identified on average. As the threshold decreased below -9, more than 
half of the subjects were correctly identified on average.  
 It is also worth noting that the range of the true accept value ranged from 0.0 to 1.0 regardless 
of LPD threshold value. This shows that our context-aware behavioral model failed to identify 
certain subjects 100% of the time, while it recognized some other subjects without mistakes. This 




Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of True Accept Rate for Context Aware Model 
Threshold Mean Min Max STD 
0 0.231 0.0 1.0 0.277 
-3 0.313 0.0 1.0 0.294 
-6 0.388 0.0 1.0 0.305 
-9 0.456 0.0 1.0 0.314 
-12 0.514 0.0 1.0 0.318 
-15 0.562 0.0 1.0 0.317 
-18 0.599 0.0 1.0 0.316 
-21 0.628 0.0 1.0 0.313 
-24 0.652 0.0 1.0 0.310 
-27 0.673 0.0 1.0 0.307 
-30 0.691 0.0 1.0 0.303 
-33 0.706 0.0 1.0 0.299 
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Figure 5 below shows the cumulative distributive frequency of the true accept rate based on 
LPD thresholds from 0 to -33. The X-axis represents the true accept rate ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. 
The Y-axis represents the number of subjects with a true accept rate lower than or equal to the 
value indicated on X-axis.  
Figure 5 shows that the performance on predicting the correct subject improved as LPD 
threshold decreased from 0 to -33. A LPD threshold of 0 gave poor performance as around 2,600 
subjects were identified as the correct subject less than 20% of the time. A LPD threshold of -33 
gave better performance as the number of subjects who were identified correctly less than 20% 
of the time dropped significantly to 350. 
 




Table 2 on the next page shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation) for the false accept rate which was calculated for each of the 46,000 
“incorrect subjects” using our context-aware behavioral model with different LPD thresholds.  
From Table 2, we can see that the mean false accept rate increased slightly as the LPD 
threshold decreased. However the rate of increase of the mean false accept rate was much slower 
than the rate of increase of the mean true accept rate as the LPD threshold decreased. 
Furthermore, the context-aware behavioral model accepted only 6% of the “incorrect subjects” 
on average even for a LPD threshold as low as -33.  
On the other hand, the false accept rate also ranged from 0.0 to 1.0 regardless of the LPD 
thresholds. This shows that the context-aware behavioral model accepted some “incorrect 
subjects” 100% of the time while it also rejected some “incorrect subjects” 100% of the time. 
Again, this indicates a possibility of the presence of outliers in the dataset, which is explored 










Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of False Accept Rate For Context Aware Model 
Threshold Mean Min Max STD 
0 0.008 0.0 1.0 0.076 
-3 0.012 0.0 1.0 0.089 
-6 0.016 0.0 1.0 0.104 
-9 0.021 0.0 1.0 0.119 
-12 0.026 0.0 1.0 0.132 
-15 0.031 0.0 1.0 0.146 
-18 0.036 0.0 1.0 0.158 
-21 0.041 0.0 1.0 0.170 
-24 0.046 0.0 1.0 0.181 
-27 0.051 0.0 1.0 0.191 
-30 0.056 0.0 1.0 0.200 










    Similar to Figure 5, Figure 6 shows the cumulative distributive frequency of the false accept 
rate based on LPD thresholds from 0 to -33. As shown in the figure below, the majority of the 
“incorrect subjects” were accepted close to 0% of the time for LPD thresholds from 0 to -33. 
While Figure 5 shows a huge improvement in performance on identifying the correct subject as 
the LPD decreased, Figure 6 shows only a slight drop in performance on filtering out the 
incorrect subjects as the LPD decreased.  
 





4.2 Context-agnostic Behavioral Model 
 
Table 3 on the following page shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, maximum, 
and standard deviation) for the true accept rate across all 4,600 subjects using our context-
agnostic behavioral model with different LPD thresholds.  
As in the context-aware model, the context-agnostic model generated higher mean true accept 
rate as the LPD threshold decreased from 0 to -33. Furthermore, the context-agnostic model also 
generated true accept rate which ranged from 0.0 to 1.0 regardless of the LPD threshold. This 
shows that our context-agnostic behavioral model also failed to identify certain subjects 100% of 
the time, while it recognized some other subjects without mistakes. 
Compared to the context-aware model, the context-agnostic model generated higher mean true 
accept rate at each value of LPD threshold. In fact, at LPD threshold of -33, the context-agnostic 
model identified the correct user close to 90% of the time on average, while the context-aware 
model identified the correct user only 70% of the time on average. The observation that the 
context-agnostic model identified the correct subjects more frequently than the context-aware 
model did is also shown in Figure 7. Figure 7 on the page after shows the cumulative distribution 
frequency of the true accept rate for both the context-aware and the context-agnostic models at 
the LPD threshold of -33. As shown in Figure 7, the number of subjects being correctly 
identified less than 20% of the time by the context-aware model was more than double that by 





Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of True Accept Rate for Context Agnostic Model 
Threshold Mean Min Max STD 
0 0.334 0.0 1.0 0.332 
-3 0.468 0.0 1.0 0.337 
-6 0.573 0.0 1.0 0.332 
-9 0.660 0.0 1.0 0.320 
-12 0.728 0.0 1.0 0.303 
-15 0.777 0.0 1.0 0.305 
-18 0.811 0.0 1.0 0.273 
-21 0.836 0.0 1.0 0.260 
-24 0.856 0.0 1.0 0.248 
-27 0.871 0.0 1.0 0.237 
-30 0.883 0.0 1.0 0.228 













Table 4 on the next page shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation) for the false accept rate across all subjects using our context-agnostic 
behavioral model with different LPD thresholds. 
As in the context-aware model, context-agnostic model had higher mean false accept rate as 
the LPD threshold decreased. The rate of increase of the mean false accept rate was also slower 
than the rate of increase of the mean true accept rate as the LPD threshold decreased. Further, all 
LPD threshold generated the false accept rate which ranged from 0.0 to 1.0. This shows that the 
context-agnostic behavioral model also accepted some “incorrect subjects” 100% of the time 
while it also rejected some “incorrect subjects” 100% of the time. 
While the context-agnostic model had a higher mean true accept rate at each LPD threshold 
value than the context-aware model, the context-agnostic model also generated smaller false 
accept rate at each LPD threshold value as well. For example, at the LPD threshold of -33, the 
context-agnostic model accepted 13.2% the “incorrect subjects” on average while the context-
aware model accepted only 6%. The observation that the context-agnostic model filtered out the 
“incorrect subjects” less frequently than the context-aware model did is also shown in Figure 8 
on the page after. Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribution frequency of the false accept rate 
for both the context-aware and the context-agnostic models at the LPD threshold of -33. As 
shown in Figure8, the number of “incorrect subjects” being accepted close to 100% of the time 
by the context-agnostic model was more than that by the context-aware model. 
In fact, the context-agnostic model and the context-aware model generated similar pairs of true 
accept rate and false accept rate at different LPD threshold value. For example, context-agnostic 
model generated a true accept rate of 0.728 and a false accept rate of 0.055 at a LPD threshold of 
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-12, while the context-aware model generated a true accept rate of 0.691 and a false accept rate 
of 0.055 at a LPD threshold of -30. Such observation shows that the addition of context 
information did not contribute to a better behavioral model. This observation is explored further 
in Section 4.3 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of False Accept Rate for Context Agnostic Model 
Threshold Mean Min Max STD 
0 0.014 0.0 1.0 0.100 
-3 0.021 0.0 1.0 0.121 
-6 0.030 0.0 1.0 0.145 
-9 0.042 0.0 1.0 0.172 
-12 0.055 0.0 1.0 0.199 
-15 0.069 0.0 1.0 0.223 
-18 0.081 0.0 1.0 0.243 
-21 0.093 0.0 1.0 0.260 
-24 0.104 0.0 1.0 0.274 
-27 0.114 0.0 1.0 0.287 
-30 0.123 0.0 1.0 0.298 
















4.3 Discussion  
 
With regards to our aim to develop a continuous authentication, both our context-aware and 
context-agnostic models are viable schemes. For the context-aware model, a LPD threshold 
of -33 authorized the correct user more than 70% of the time while it authorized the incorrect 
user only 6% of the time. During the 30% of the time when our context-aware model rejected the 
correct user, the phone could possibly prompt the user with an initial authentication method so 
that the correct user could continue to use his phone and the wrongly labeled data entry could 
then be used to update and improve our context-aware behavioral model.  
While a 70% true accept rate might seem to entail a lot of re-logins, such result is actually 
comparable to results reported by relevant research [9]. Furthermore, decreasing the LPD 
threshold even further below -33 can lead to a higher true accept rate and less trouble of re-logins. 
For example, a LPD threshold of -66 generated 80.6% true accept rate. However, the false accept 
rate also rose to 10.0% at a LPD threshold of -66. Ultimately, the setting of LPD threshold would 
determine the fine balance between convenience (fewer re-logins for authentic users) and 
security (fewer incorrect users accepted). How to set the appropriate LPD threshold would be 
explored in future work.   
With regards to our aim of developing a hierarchical authentication method, both our 
context-aware and context-agnostic behavioral models demonstrate the possibility of satisfying a 
hierarchy of users’ security needs. Since both the false accept rate and the true accept rate 
increased with decreasing LPD threshold, it is possible to allow the user to specify different LPD 
thresholds to correspond to different security needs. A banking app with sensitive content might 
need a higher (i.e., less negative) threshold than a weather app with no personal content. The 
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higher threshold for the banking app will block most of the incorrect users (low false accept rate), 
but it will also require more frequent re-logins for the correct users (low true accept rate). The 
reverse is true for the low threshold for the weather app. Once again, the determination of the 
appropriate LPD thresholds for different apps requires further exploration.  
Contrary to our assumption, the context-agnostic and the context-aware behavioral models 
have similar performances in identifying the correct or the incorrect user, albeit at different LPD 
threshold value. One reason may be a suboptimal selection for the contextual features and the 
context clustering algorithm. Either the location context itself or the location context clusters 
found by DBSCAN might not be indicative of different app-usage patterns. Figure 9 below 
shows a histogram of the number of clusters found by DBSCAN for each of the 4,600 subjects. It 
is clear from Figure 9 that a vast majority of subjects have only one or two context classes 
identified by DBSCAN. The small number of context clusters identified might partially explain 




Figure 9 Histogram of Number of Clusters Found by DBSCAN 
 
There may be other reasons for the unsatisfactory performance of the context-aware model. 
First, the context-dependent behaviors might not be properly modeled by GMM. A different 
behavioral model might generate better results for the context-aware model than the context-
agnostic model. Second, the data collection of the Device Analyzer Dataset is entirely voluntary 
and therefore sporadic. Some subjects have huge gaps between two consecutive data collections. 
Therefore a Wi-Fi scan may be very far away from its closest subsequent incidence of app-usage 
data collection. The misalignment between the contextual data and the behavioral data might 
explain why context did not contribute to a more accurate behavioral model. We could possibly 
38 
 
eliminate this problem by having a stricter selection of qualified subjects, who have more 
consistent data collection.  
In our experiments, we found some subjects with a true accept rate as low as 0.0, and others 
with a false accept rate as high as 1.0. That is, there were certain outliers among the subjects who 
could not be properly modeled by our context-aware or context-agnostic behavioral model. Such 
outliers may arise because we divided the 21-day of data sequentially into training and testing set. 
It is possible that the testing set happened to correspond to a period when the subject behaved 
abnormally. Those outliers may also arise due to the lack of data for that subject. In fact, our 
minimum requirement of 1,000 data entries, if collected at 5-minutes intervals, corresponds to 
just 3.5 days of data out of the 21-day period of data collection. Figure 10 below shows a 
6-degree polynomial fit of a scatter plot of the true accept rate against the number of data entries 
of each of the 4,600 subjects. The true accept rate was calculated based on the context-aware 
model using a LPD threshold of -33. It is clear that an increase in the number of data entries 
generally led to an increase in the true accept rate. But, there is a dip in the true accept rate 
around 7,000 data entries. As shown in Appendix I, such a dip may be due to a lack of subjects 
















5 Future Work 
 
In the future, we need to investigate why location context did not contribute to a better 
behavioral model as we had originally proposed. We also need to find out a systematic way of 
determining the LPD thresholds for different apps and under different contexts. In the end, we 
propose a hypothetical Android authentication app based on our scheme.    
5.1 Further Investigation of Our Assumption 
 
    As discussed in Section 4.3, the context-aware and the context-agnostic models yielded similar 
results, which is contrary to our initial assumption that user behaviors depend on contexts and 
context-aware model should be more accurate. To investigate why our initial assumption did not 
hold, we would experiment with other behavioral and contextual features, different context 
classification algorithms, and more nuanced behavioral models. More experiments would 
hopefully tell us whether our initial assumption is indeed wrong or our choice of algorithm was 
suboptimal and misled our conclusion.  
5.1.1 Other Behavioral and Contextual Features 
 
In our approach, we assume the app-usage patterns to be dependent on the location context 
indicated by Wi-Fi MAC addresses. If we have more data on GPS in the future, we could 
experiment with GPS coordinates as an indicator of location context. We could also experiment 
with different features to augment Wi-Fi MAC addresses to find better context classes that are 
more indicative of different app-usage patterns. For example, the physical activity level of the 
smartphone users might be a good indicator of usage context since users are likely to use 
41 
 
different apps when they are still as compared to when they are moving. The activity level can 
easily be extracted from sensor data. 
Our behavioral model has relied exclusively on app-usage data such as the duration of 
foreground app-usage, the number of apps used, the duration of usage of the top three apps, and 
the time of the day. A more accurate model of app-usage pattern might include more features 
such as the ratings of the apps at foreground as reported by Google Play, the date of last update 
of the apps at foreground, and the category of apps used at foreground as given by Google Play. 
We could also experiment with the duration of usage of the top five, top seven, or maybe top ten 
apps.  
Besides experimenting with other behavioral and contextual features, we also need to ensure 
each incidence of behavioral data collection aligns with its corresponding incidence of contextual 
data collection. As mentioned in Section 4.3, a Wi-Fi scan might be far away from its subsequent 
app-usage data collection. The misalignment between the contextual data and the behavioral data 
could be eliminated by having a stricter selection of qualified subjects who should not have large 
gaps between consecutive data collections on context and behaviors.  
Furthermore, we could experiment with setting a higher requirement for the minimum number 
of data entries for the qualified subjects. As discussed in Section 4.3, the lack of data entry for 
some subjects might lead to the presence of outliers. As such, selecting subjects with more than, 
say 2,000, data entries might help alleviate the problem of outliers and build a better context-




5.1.2 Better Context Classification 
 
    As discussed in Section 4.3, the current context clustering algorithms found only 1 or 2 
contexts for the majority of the subjects. We could experiment with a better clustering algorithm 
for contextual features. For example, a hierarchical clustering algorithm could be used instead of 
DBSCAN. It is also possible to keep the DBSCAN algorithm and experiment with different 
distance functions for Wi-Fi MAC addresses and different epsilon and min_samples value.   
5.1.3 Better Behavioral Model 
 
Currently, we use one GMM per context to model the usage patterns. We would explore a 
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to model the context-dependent behavioral patterns. In our 
proposed HMM, different context classes would represent different hidden states. Each context 
class would have different transition probabilities to other context classes and to itself. Each 
context class would have emission probabilities modeled by GMM for different behavioral 
features. Both transition probabilities and perimeters of GMM for emission probabilities would 
be found through expectation-maximization. 
5.2 Determination of LPD Threshold 
 
As discussed in Section 4.3, a higher LPD threshold means more security (fewer “incorrect 
subjects” accepted) but less convenience (more frequent re-logins for authentic users), while a 
lower LPD threshold means less security but more convenience. Ideally, we should have a high 
LPD threshold for apps with sensitive contents (e.g. Banking, HealthCare, and Shopping) and for 
contexts that are vulnerable to adversarial attacks (e.g. unfamiliar contexts). In contrast, we 
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should have a low LPD threshold for apps without personal information (e.g. Weather, Alarm, 
and News) and for contexts where thefts are less likely (e.g. home).  
To find out the exact value of the high and low LPD thresholds, we could conduct a survey 
among 100 people to ask them what the acceptable ranges of the true accept rate and the false 
accept rate are for different apps and under different contexts. We would then set the same LPD 
thresholds for all users according to the survey results. For example, if the majority of the survey 
participants indicated that they want their Banking app to be never available to strangers (i.e. 
close to 0% false accept rate) and they would be fine having multiple re-logins for this Banking 
app (i.e. low true accept rate), we would set the LPD threshold for this Banking app for all phone 
users at 0, which has 0.8% false accept rate and 23.1% true accept rate.  
Besides setting a generic LPD threshold for all users, we could also experiment with setting 
different LPD thresholds for different users. For example, we could survey each phone user who 
chooses to use our scheme. We would ask each user about the acceptable ranges of the true 
accept rate and the false accept rate for each app on the phone and for all common contexts. If 
one phone user indicates that he prefers to have fewer re-logins even for the Banking app, we 
could set the LPD threshold for the Banking app on his phone to be -33, which has 70% true 
accept rate and 6% false accept rate.  
5.3 The Android Authentication App 
 
    We could use our context-aware behavioral model to build an Android app that would take 
into considerations the hierarchy of security needs of smartphone users and continuously 
authenticate users as they are using the phones. The overall structure and some considerations of 
this hypothetical app are described as follows.  
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5.3.1 App Overview 
 
The authentication app would passively collect contextual and behavioral features in the 
background. For the first three weeks after installation, the app would train a context-aware 
behavioral model for the user. After the first three weeks, the app would use the developed 
model to authenticate the user continuously. The authentication could be either system-wide or 
app-specific. Based on the continuously calculated LPD of the user’s behaviors in contexts, the 
user would be locked out of the phone usage if his LPD is lower than the threshold specified for 
the phone or he would not gain access to certain sensitive apps which have a higher LPD 
threshold than his calculated LPD. All authorized usage after the first three weeks would be used 
to continuously update the model. 
5.3.2 Sampling Frequency 
 
One consideration for the deployment of the app is how frequently the app should collect the 
contextual and behavioral features from the phone. A sampling frequency that is too high would 
drain the battery fast. A sampling frequency that is too low would not adequately capture 
behavioral changes between two data collection incidences nor identify the correct and incorrect 
users timely. 
The Device Analyzer Dataset has an unknown sampling frequency. A close inspection of 
some data files reveals a sampling frequency of about one sample per five minutes. Such 
sampling rate is too low in our opinion, as it would take five minutes for the model to identify 
the incorrect user and much sensitive information would have already been stolen during this 
five-minute interval. Ideally, we want out sampling frequency to be one sample per few seconds 
so the incorrect user would be identified and locked out immediately. 
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5.3.3 Automatic Switching from Training to Deployment 
 
Our proposed approach for the authentication app specifies that the app would train a context-
aware behavioral model and start authenticating users three weeks after installation. The choice 
of three weeks is entirely heuristic, however. Kayacik et al. have suggested that the app should 
be able to automatically switch from training to deployment once the behavioral model is 
sufficiently stable [16]. We could alternatively build our model incrementally based on each 
incoming data entry. Once the model has minimum change between two consecutive data 
updates, the app should start authenticating the users.   
5.3.4 Storage and Computation: Local or the Cloud 
 
Another concern for this authentication app is where the context-aware behavioral model 
should be computed and stored. Training and storing the behavioral model in the cloud might 
provide faster training and authentication time given the resources available in the cloud. The 
cloud-based approach would also free up space on the smartphones [9]. However the cloud-
based approach might incur too much latency if the phone must access the remote model each 
time it needs to authenticate a user. Furthermore, storing sensitive behavioral and contextual 
information on the cloud might also raise privacy risks.  
5.3.5 Model Update 
 
In the future, we need to study ways to incrementally update our context classes and 




5.3.6 Adversarial Model 
 
   As future work, we could also explore a different adversarial model for our authentication app. 
Kayacik et al. suggested four attack case studies: “uninformed outsider”, “informed outsider”, 
“uninformed insider”, and “informed insider” [16]. In our case, an “uninformed outsider” would 
be an incorrect user with different contexts and different behaviors. An “informed outsider” 
would be an incorrect user with different contexts but similar behaviors. An “uninformed insider” 
would be an incorrect user with similar contexts but different behaviors. An “informed insider” 
would be an incorrect user with similar contexts and similar behaviors. 
    To calculate the false accept rate, we evaluated the LPD of the first 100 data entries of 10 
other randomly selected subjects for each original subject. We assumed all 100 data entries 
belonged to the noisy context of the original subject (different contexts), and we picked the other 
10 subjects randomly so the behaviors of the 10 subjects might be different from those of the 
original subject (different behaviors). As such, our adversarial model is essentially an 









6 Summary and Conclusion 
 
    We proposed a new scheme for continuous and hierarchical authentication on the smartphones. 
The key assumption of our scheme was that the app-usage patterns are dependent on location 
context. We built both a context-aware behavioral model and a context-agnostic behavioral 
model. We tested both models on 4,600 subjects from the Device Analyzer Dataset. Our 
experimental results indicated that both the context-aware and the context-agnostic behavioral 
models are viable continuous and hierarchical authentication schemes. Contrary to our initial 
assumption, the addition of location context does not contribute to an improvement in the 
performance of our behavioral model. Future work could explore why our assumption did not 
hold and how to set the LPD thresholds systematically. An Android authentication app would 
















First and foremost, I would love to thank my thesis advisor, David Kotz. He has been a 
tremendously helpful and inspiring mentor throughout my first adventure of writing a research 
paper. I could have written a very generic paragraph about how Professor Kotz has taught me the 
important techniques of sound research and effective communication. However, I prefer to take 
this opportunity to write down three most memorable moments during my senior thesis research 
with Professor Kotz. The first moment was when Professor Kotz finally approved my research 
poster which I was going to present at Johns Hopkins University. This final draft was in fact the 
SEVENTH draft of my poster, which I spent weeks editing and improving on. For every single 
draft, Professor Kotz provided valuable and detailed suggestions. Those suggestions not only 
helped me make huge improvements on my poster, but also taught me how to communicate my 
ideas in an effective and succinct way. The second moment was when I just finished presenting 
my poster at Johns Hopkins University and Professor Kotz came quietly to my seat to give me a 
thumb-up. The encouragement made me feel so proud of my own work and energized me to do 
even better at my senior thesis. The last moment was when Professor Kotz talked about the 
possibility of publishing this paper if more work could be accomplished. Never in my life would 
I have imagined the publication of my OWN paper. I believe this is preciously the trademark of a 
great mentor, who broadens people’ horizons and help them see the many possibilities in life.  
Next, I would love to thank Dr. Andrés Molina-Markham for the initial idea of this project. Dr. 
Molina-Markham helped me to develop the initial codes on this project. He also gave me expert 
technical advice throughout my senior thesis research.  
49 
 
Many thanks also go to Dr. Alina Oprea for her technical suggestions and unwavering moral 
support throughout the research. 
I would also love to thank Mr. Shrirang Mare for helping me with the initial downloads of the 
Device Analyzer Dataset. I would love to thank Mr. Tim Tregubov and Mr. Yoonjoo Choi for 
helping me to use the Anthill cluster. 
I sincerely appreciate the Device Analyzer Dataset provided by Cambridge University. 
I sincerely thank RSA Laboratories for supporting this research project in its initial stages. 
This research results from a research program at the Institute for Security, Technology, and 
Society at Dartmouth College, supported by the National Science Foundation under award 
number CNS-1329686. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the 
authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either 










Appendix I Data Quality of the 4,600 Subjects 
 
We selected only those 4,600 subjects in the Device Analyzer Dataset who have at least 1,000 
data entries for their first 21 days of data. Figure 11 below shows the histogram of number of 
data entries (must be larger than 1000) for each of the 4,600 subjects. Figure 12 below shows the 
histogram of number of days of data collection (must be smaller than 22) for each of the 4,600 
subjects. Figure 13 below shows the histogram of the number of data entries per day for each of 
the 4,600 subjects. 
 




Figure 12 Histogram of Number of Days of Data Collection per Subject 
 




Appendix II DBSCAN Clustering Results 
 
    To select appropriate values for epsilon and min_samples, we selected 20 representative 
subjects who had at least 1,000 entries of Wi-Fi MAC addresses and GPS coordinates for the 
first 21 days of data collection. For each subject, we clustered his Wi-Fi MAC addresses using 
epsilon values increasing from 0.1 to 0.9 at an interval of 0.2, and min_samples values increasing 
from 60 to 150 at an interval of 30. We define the best epsilon and min_samples value pair to be 
the one which generated relatively fewer “noisy points” and produced a reasonable number of 
clusters (e.g. 1~5).  
Figure 14 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, and maximum) for the number of 
clusters for the 20 representative subjects against the five different values of epsilon (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 
0.7, 0.9). Figure 15 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, and maximum) for the 
number of “noisy points” for the 20 representative subjects against the five different values of 
epsilon (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9).   
Figure 16 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, and maximum) for the number of 
clusters for the 20 representative subjects against the four different values of min_samples (60, 
90, 120, 150). Figure 17 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, and maximum) for the 
number of “noisy points” for the 20 representative subjects against the four different values of 






Figure 14 Number of Clusters Against EPS for 20 Representative Subjects 
 




Figure 16 Number of Clusters Against MIN_SAMPLES for 20 Representative Subjects 
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